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The Role  of Farm Ownership  in
Off-Farm Work Participation
Edmund M. Tavernier, Tugrul T. Temel,  and Farong Li
A  labor supply model is used  to examine  the relationship  between farm  ownership  and
operators'  participation in the  off-farm labor market for the  Northeast region. The results
indicate that ownership  significantly  influences  operators'  off-farm  employment  participation.
In  particular,  part-owners  significantly  allocate  labor services  to off-farm  activities.  The results
also show  that the participation  rate  among part-owner  operators  is high partly because  the
availability of other income  sources  accelerates  the process  of acquiring  assets to become
full-owner  operators.
Among  the  factors  influencing  the  decisions  of  owners,  and  tenants)  has  been  ignored  in  the  lit-
farm  operators  to  participate  in  off-farm  work,  erature.
farm ownership has  received little  attention  in the  This study hypothesizes that farm ownership in-
literature. 1 The  failure  is  particularly  salient  be-  fluences decisions regarding off-farm work partici-
cause of the increasing importance  of off-farm  in-  pation because operators in different categories are
come  to  farm  families  (Ahearn,  Johnson,  and  likely to have  different objectives  and  face  differ-
Strickland 1985; Ahearn and Lee 1991). Moreover,  ent economic  constraints.  For instance,  tenants and
understanding  the  reasons for  off-farm  work par-  part-owner  operators  are  more  likely  than  full-
ticipation  may  help  guide  land  policy  and  other  owner  operators  to  expand  their  production  base
public policies that affect  not only the structure  of  because  they  might perceive  off-farm  income  as
farm  ownership  but also  the  behavior of farmers'  necessary  capital  for full-ownership.
labor supply  decisions.  A  brief  survey  of  the  literature  indicates  that
Nationally,  the percentage  of farm operators re-  researchers  have focused  on four factors influenc-
porting any off-farm  work was approximately  54%  ing  off-farm  work  participation.  The first factor
in  1982,  56%  in  1987,  and 55%  in  1992.  Thirty-  addresses  the  effect  of  human capital and local
four  percent  of  the  operators  reporting  any  off-  labor market developments on off-farm  work par-
farm work had worked 200 days  or more per year  ticipation (Huffman  1977a,  1977b,  1980;  Huffman
off  their  farms  (U.S.  Department  of  Commerce  and Lange  1989;  Sumner  1982;  Ahearn,  Johnson,
1992;  hereafter  1992  Census  of Agriculture).  Al-  and  Strickland  1985;  Jensen  and  Salant  1985;
though  off-farm  employment  participation  has  Gould and  Saupe  1989;  Gladwin  1991;  Lass  and
been  viewed as an important means of stabilizing  Gempesaw  1992). Huffman presents evidence that
total  household  income  (Aheam  and  Lee  1991;  investment in education and agricultural extension
Fuller  1991;  Gebremehdin  1991;  Spitze  and  Ma-  services  increases  farmers'  off-farm  labor  supply
honey  1991;  Bartlett  1991),  the  examination  of  by  increasing  the  reallocative  ability  of  farmers.
farm operators'  income  stabilization  efforts across  Sumner shows that urbanization positively contrib-
farm  ownership categories  (i.e.,  full-owners,  part-  utes to returns  from  off-farm  activities  because  of
increasing  off-farm job opportunities.  The second
factor  examines  the  importance of the farm char-
acteristics and farm family  structure in  the  deci-
The  authors, respectively,  are  assistant professor, Department  of Agri-  ion  to  articiate  in  fffarm  r  (ilenny
cultural  Economics  and  Marketing,  Rutgers  University;  post-doctorate  sion  to  participate  in  off-farm  work  (Kilkenny
associate,  Department  of Agricultural  Economics  and Marketing,  Rut-  1993;  Kimhi  1994).  Kilkenny  and  Kimhi  present
gers  University; and statistician,  Johnson and Johnson Inc., New Jersey.  evidence  that  participation  in  the  off-farm  labor
We wish  to acknowledge  the  helpful comments  of two  anonymous  re-
viewers.  market  differs  across  type of farming  and  marital
1  Off-farm employment  does not  necessarily  mean  that the  employ-  status of farm families. The third factor  addresses
ment is  in the nonagricultural  sector,  since  an operator  who  chooses to  the  importance  of urbanization and its effects  on
work  on another  farm  will  be classified  as  an  off-farm  operator. The
Census of Agriculture defines the term off-farm broadly to capture all the  agriculture through land conversion, input-output
activities  undertaken out of the operator's  own farm.  price distortions, and regulatory arrangements68  April 1997  Agricultural  and Resource Economics Review
(Lopez, Adelaja,  and Andrews  1988; Berry  1978).  agricultural  production.  Third,  age  and gender  of
The  authors  observe  that  during  the  process  of  operators  significantly contribute  to off-farm  work
urbanization,  land tends  to be  idle in  anticipation  participation.  In particular,  female  and elderly  op-
of conversion,  which  creates pressures  to increase  erators  are  more  likely  to  participate  in  off-farm
income  from  off-farm  employment.  Finally,  activities. Finally, both farming experience  and the
Gustafson  and  Bills  (1984),  Lee  (1982,  1983),  existence  of  supplementary  income  reduce  off-
Lewis  (1978),  Wunderlich  (1991,  1993),  and  farm work participation.  Overall,  the  results  with
USDA  (1994)  argue  that during the urbanization  respect  to the relationship between  ownership  and
process farmland ownership patterns tend  to  off-farm  employment  suggest that part-owner  op-
change  before  conversion. Gustafson  and  Bills  erators tend  to  work off the  farm mainly because
show that  about one-third of the land with the po-  off-farm employment is seen as a source of supple-
tential for conversion in the Northeast is located in  mentary  income  required  for  the  continuation  of
the  most urbanized counties,  which  implies a pos-  farming  activities.
sible change  in  farm  ownership  pattern.  Overall,  The paper is organized as follows. Following the
urbanization  changes  farmland  ownership  pattern  introduction, we discuss some of the relationships
and directs farm operators  toward off-farm work to  among farm ownership,  type of farming  activities,
enhance farm household income.  Thus, it is impor-  and off-farm work participation using a correlation
tant to investigate ownership patterns  and off-farm  matrix.  In the next section, we present a labor sup-
work  tendencies  of  farm  operators  in  urbanized  ply model for farm operators who have the option
areas.  of allocating  labor  to either  farm  or  nonfarm  ac-
It is  clear  from  the  above  studies  that research  tivities.  The following  section describes the econ-
has  ignored  the  influence  of farm  ownership  on  ometric  estimation  used  in the  analysis.  We  then
off-farm  work  participation.  Furthermore,  to  our  discuss  some  features  of the  data  and  define  the
knowledge,  the relationships  among  farm owner-  variables  used in the  estimation. The next section
ship,  off-work  participation,  and  urbanization,  discusses  the  results  of the  empirical  framework
which  are  of particular  importance  to the  North-  developed above. Finally, we summarize the major
east, have not been examined in the literature. As a  conclusions  and discuss their implications.
result  of  these  omissions,  research  has  failed  to
inform the public debate on off-farm work partici-
pation  and land-use  issues and thus  has  provided  Background
little guidance to policymakers examining land-use
policy.  We  hypothesize  that  the  increasing  non-  The correlation matrix provides some insights with
farm-use  value  of farmland due  to high  urbaniza-  respect  to  the relationship  between  off-farm  em-
tion  (measured  by  population  density  in  persons  ployment and farm ownership.  These relationships
per square mile)  and the land ownership  structure  are  discussed in detail  below.
in the  Northeast  are likely  (1) to  cause inefficient  The  correlation  of -0.91  between  urbanization
input decisions due  to distorted farm input prices,  and the acres of land held by a full-owner operator
(2) to create an unwillingness to invest in farming,  indicates that such operators  are less likely to have
and  (3)  to lead to the conversion  of farmland  into  farmland  in  highly  urbanized  areas.  This  result
nonfarm  use.  During  this  process  of  conversion,  may be due to the high opportunity cost of farming
farm organizations  with shorter planning  horizons  in  urbanized  areas,  where  the  estimated  market
tend  to  own  a greater proportion  of  farmland  for  value  of land  is  significant.  Essentially,  the  same
speculative  purposes  (speculation  is  measured  by  relationship (-0.74) holds for part-owners  as well.
the ratio of the value of per acre land in the North-  These  findings  suggest  that  full-owner  and part-
east to  the  value  of  per  acre  land  in  the  United  owner operators tend to hold small parcels  of land
States) and to rely on off-farm  employment  activi-  in areas  where the  land value  is high.
ties  to supplement  their incomes  (Spitze and  Ma-  The findings  also lead to the following observa-
honey  1991;  Saupe and Gould 1991; Gebremedhin  tions.  First, full/part-owner  operators  tend not to
1991;  Gladwin  1991).  hold land with immediate potential for conversion.
Some of the results obtained from the estimation  This  observation  is  consistent  with  the  conven-
of  the  off-farm  work  participation  model  are  as  tional wisdom that  suggests that  the  size of farm-
follows.  First,  declining  farm  output  encourages  land  (measured  by  the  acres  of land  per  farm)  is
farm operators  to  seek  employment  opportunities  negatively correlated with urbanization  and market
in the off-farm  labor market. Second, participation  value of land. The correlations for size and urban-
in the  off-farm  labor market  is high  among  part-  ization and for size and market value are -0.86 and
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that  the  correlation  of  -0.45  between  age  of  an  in  farm  production  decisions.  The  analysis  indi-
operator  and  acres  of  land held by  a part-owner  rectly  suggests  that  full-owners,  part-owners,  and
operator  implies  that  in  states  where  part-owner  tenants  differ  in  their output and  input decisions.
operators  are  in  the  majority,  the  average  age  is  The  ultimate  question  addressed  by  this study  is
low  or to  some  degree  the  average  age  of  part-  the  extent to which these differences  and farmers'
owner operators is low. In this respect, part-owners  characteristics  account for the variation in off-farm
are expected to be more likely to expand their pro-  work  participation.  To  address  this  question,  we
duction base than  are  other agents.  examine  the  relationships  among the  structure  of
A  careful  examination  of  the  correlation  be-  farm ownership, farm output, and the propensity to
tween the type of land  an operator owns  and farm  participate  in off-farm  work for  the Northeast  re-
ownership provides a framework for understanding  gion. The initial  evidence  indicates  that participa-
the  relationship  between  ownership  and  farming  tion is high in  states where  the  average  age of an
activities.  First,  part-owner  operators  are  more  operator and the number of female operators (rela-
likely to hold cropland than  are full-owner  opera-  tive to  male) are high, and  participation  is low  in
tors.  This observation is supported by  the correla-  states  where  per  farm  total  sales,  per  farm  live-
tion  of acres  of  cropland per  farm  with  acres  of  stock/poultry  sales, the number of farm enterprises
land per  part-owner  and  full-owner  operator  (the  organized  as  partnerships,  and per farm  cropland
correlations  are 0.89  and 0.72, respectively).  Sec-  are high (see table  1).
ond,  compared  with  part-owner  operators,  full-  While  the  above  observations  strongly  indicate
owner  operators  engage  in  labor-intensive  live-  that the  characteristics  of farming  and farm opera-
stock and poultry farming.  This conclusion  is also  tors are important factors that help explain the mo-
supported  by  the correlation  of acres  of land per  tivation for participating  in off-farm work, what is
full-owner  (0.68)  and part-owner  operator  (0.62)  less clear,  and  to our knowledge  has not been ad-
with per farm livestock  and poultry  sales.  To  this  dressed  in the  literature,  is the  role of farm  own-
end, full-owners tend to hold land for livestock and  ership  in the off-farm  work participation.
poultry  farming,  which  reduces  the  chances  for
participating  in off-farm  work, while  part-owners
are  involved  mostly  in  seasonal  crop  farming,  The Model
which allows them to look for job opportunities off
the farm.  The  labor  supply  model,  developed  by  Huffman
The comparison of the two different farming ac-  (1980),  is  treated  as  a  set  of  joint  decisions  for
tivities  with respect to off-farm  employment  sug-  leisure  and market goods. The model assumes  that
gests that farm operators in states where crop farm-  utility is derived from farm production that is sub-
ing dominates  are more likely to work off the farm.  ject to the constraints of time, farm production, and
This  observation  is  supported  by  the  correlations  income.  This model  describes  a commercial  farm
between  off-farm  work participation  and per farm  that  employs  both hired and family labor and that
cropland,  -0.59,  and  per  farm  livestock  sales,  markets  all its output and operates in a competitive
-0.61.  The  inference  that  both  livestock/poultry  labor market  (Barnum  and Squire  1979;  Huffman
and  nursery/greenhouse  are  more  labor  intensive  1980).
than crop farming  is also supported by the positive  Operators'  off-farm work participation is formu-
correlation  of per farm livestock/poultry  sales and  lated in such  a way  that  each operator  maximizes
of  per  farm  nursery/greenhouse  sales  with  the  his/her  utility,  U(C,TL;V1).  The  function  U(.)  is
number of years an operator spends on the present  assumed  to  be  strictly  concave  and  satisfy  Uc-
farm  (0.58  and 0.63;  see  table  1).  (C,TL;V)  =  aU(.)/OC  >  0  and  UT(CTL;V1) -
The  above  observations  summarize  the  impor-  aU(.)/aTL  > 0.  The  total  amount  of  goods  pur-
tance  of farm ownership  structure  on land  conver-  chased by an operator is denoted by C and the total
sion  and  suggest  implications  for  off-farm  work  leisure  time of the  operator by  TL.  The vector, V1
participation.  Farm  ownership  may  also  impact  - (V,.  . ., V"), includes  factors exogenous  to op-
farm productivity. This hypothesis is tested empiri-  erators'  consumption  and leisure  decisions.
cally  by  estimating  a  Cobb-Douglas  production  An operator faces  the time  constraint,
function that includes ownership categories. In par-  T 
ticular,  full  ownership  influences  farm  output  ()  F  OF +  L
negatively, while  a positive relationship exists  be-  where his/her total time endowment is denoted  by
tween  tenancy  and farm  output  (table  2).  The re-  T; TF and  TOF denote  the  time  allocated  for farm
suits of the  estimation  of the production  function  and off-farm activities, respectively. The farm pro-
present evidence  that farm ownership is important  duction function,70  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table  1.  Correlation Matrix (greater  than or equal to 0.35)
X(1)  X(2)  X(3)  X(4)  X(5)  X(6)  X(7)  X(8)  X(9)  X(10)
X(1)  1.00  -0.76  -0.57  -0.54  -0.70  0.74
X(2)  1.00  0.85  -0.37  0.67  0.97  -0.89  0.68
X(3)  1.00  -0.45  0.87  0.94  -0.73  0.62
X(4)  1.00  -0.49  -0.55  -0.45  0.59  -0.46
X(5)  1.00  0.39  0.82  -0.58  -0.56  0.65
X(6)  1.00  -0.59  0.76
X(7)  1.00  -0.84  -0.40  0.74
X(8)  1.00  -0.51
X(9)  1.00  -0.61
X(10)  1.00
X(ll)  X(12)  X(13)  X(14)  X(15)  X(16)  X(17)  X(18)  X(19)
X(1)  0.35  0.37  -0.56  0.36  0.70  0.73
X(2)  -0.54  -0.44  0.72  -0.36  -0.87  -0.91
X(3)  -0.38  0.89  -0.55  -0.61  -0.74
X(4)  0.42  -0.52  0.40
X(5)  0.99  0.39  -0.81  0.47  -0.47  -0.52
X(6)  0.35  0.44  0.41  0.78  -0.44  0.73
X(7)  -0.44  0.86  -0.51  -0.80  -0.86
X(8)  0.48  0.39  0.38  -0.63  0.48  0.91  0.85
X(9)  -0.59  -0.38  0.59  -0.70  0.35
X(10)  -0.48  0.70  0.58  -0.53  0.48  -0.69  -0.70
X(11)  1.00  0.49
X(12)  1.00  0.63  -0.36  0.48
X(13)  1.00  0.65  0.64
X(14)  1.00  0.41  -0.80  0.46  -0.54  -0.57
X(15)  1.00  -0.55  0.63
X(16)  1.00  -0.40  0.39
X(17)  1.00
X(18)  1.00  0.93
X(19)  1.00
X(1)  =  Per farm  crop  sales (including nursery,  $1,000)
X(2)  =  Per full-owner  operator's  land (acres)
X(3)  =  Per part-owner operator's  land (acres)
X(4)  =  Average age of an  operator
X(5)  =  Per farm  harvested cropland  (acres)
X(6)  =  Per farm  total  sales  ($1,000)
X(7)  =  Per farm  total land  (acres)
X(8)  =  Per  farm land  value ($1,000)
X(9)  =  Number of off-farm operators  (any/none)
X(10)  =  Per farm livestock/poultry  sales  ($1,000)
X(11)  =  Per farm  dairy sales  ($1,000)
X(12)  =  Per farm nursery/greenhouse  sales  ($1,000)
X(13)  =  Per farm grain sales  ($1,000)
X(14)  =  Per farm  cropland  (acres)
X(15)  =  Average number  of years  spent on present farm
X(16)  =  Number of operators  (female/male)
X(17)  =  Number of farms  (partnership/family)
X(18)  =  Estimated market value of land  ($1,000)  (SPECU)
X(19)  =  1990  population  per square mile (URBAN)
(2)  Q  =  F(Tr,fl;V2, A),  tics  that are  taken  as  given by  the  operator  at the
is  assumed  to  be  strictly  concave  and to  exhibit  time he/she  makes  production and input-use deci-
constant  returns  to  scale. Let  Q and A  denote  the  sions. These characteristics  include tenure of orga-
farm output and the  amount  of land used in farm  nizaton  (full-owner  or part-owner  operators  and
production, respectively.  The vector, f  (f  tenants)  and type  of organization  (i.e.,  individual/
family,  partnership, and corporation). 1s),  denotes  other variable  inputs with the  associ-  family,  partnership,  and corporation). ,ated  input price  vector  i  n  o,,..., o). These  . We assume that farm operators  face the follow- ated  input  price  vector  wo =_  ((ol,.  . w(os).  These  ing budget constraint:
inputs  include  hired  farm  labor,  capital,  and  en-  constraint
ergy. The vector,  V2, represents  farm characteris-  (3)  PcC + O.f  =  PQQ + wTOF + RTavernier, Temel, and Li  Farm Ownership and Off-Farm Work  71
Table 2.  Estimation of Farm Output with Farm Ownership Variables
Model  1  Model  2  Model 3
Independent
Variables  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.  Coef.  t-stat.
C  -0.26  (-0.35)  -0.56  (-0.81)  -0.98  (-1.47)
In(CAPITAL)  0.34  (1.73)  *  0.26  (1.42)  0.34  (1.76)*
In(LABOR)  0.09  (2.39)**  0.08  (2.03)**  0.07  (1.87)*
ln(LAND)  -0.11  (-1.51)  0.02  (0.32)  0.03  (0.39)
In(LST)  0.00  (3.04)**  0.00  (3.24)**  0.00  (3.10)**
ln(p*LST)  0.00  (2.54)**  0.00  (2.75)**  0.00  (2.82)**
In(ENERGY)  0.09  (1.44)  0.09  (1.53)  0.07  (1.29)
ln(FEED)  0.31  (9.22)**  0.30  (8.90)**  0.31  (9.31)**
ln(FER-SEED)  0.35  (5.21)**  0.32  (4.81)**  0.34  (5.12)**
In(F-OWN)  -0.09  (-1.01)  -0.11  (-1.67)*
In(P-OWN)  0.14  (1.69)*  -0.06  (-0.84)
In(TENANT)  0.14  (2.94)**  0.11  (2.14)**
R
2 0.73  0.74  0.74
n  158  158  158
* and **, respectively,  indicate  0.1  and 0.05  significance  levels. The ownership  variables, F-OWN,  P-OWN,  and TENANT,  are
defined as  the proportion of full-owner,  part-owner, and tenant operators,  respectively  (F-OWN + P-OWN + TENANT  =  1).
where  PQ  and  Pc denote  for  the  price  of  farm  (9)  Q = Q(TF,l),  "production function"
output  and  the  price  vector  of  purchased  goods,
respectively.  The variable R is the operator's  non-  (10)  C = C(Q,f,ToF),  "budget constraint"
wage income  and is considered  exogenous  to his/  where  denotes  the vector  of inputs  excluding
her consumption  and leisure  decisions.  A  her consumption  and leisure  decisions.  a-  j. Equations (5)-(10) show that an operator's de-
Given  (co,w,PQ,Pc,T,A,RV 5 ,V 2),  a farm  opera-  cision to participate in off-farm work,  TO,  is made
tor maximizes  his/her  utility  subject  to  the  con-  simultaneously  with decisions regarding the use of
straints  (1),  (2),  (3),  and nonnegativity  conditions  farm  iputs,  ncluding  operator's  on-farm  work,
(C,  QQ, T,  TO,  TL)  O.  The  choice variables  in  T.  In  other words,  the  system of equations  (5)-
dlude  (CQ,,  T,  TFTL). The  Lagrangian  equa-  s(10)  is  simultaneously  solved  for  the  variables
tion, oS(CeQmaTFTOFiz  TLon  prbU2,3),  correspond-  (C,Q,W,TF, TF,TL) as a function of the production
ing  to  the  maximization problem  is,  and  utility  parameters  and  exogenous  variables.
(4)  U(.)  +  I [T - TF - TOF - TLJ  Strict concavity of farm production  and operators'
+ p.2[P Q  + wTOF  utility functions together with the linear constraints
+ R - PcC - (.}]  guarantee  the existence and uniqueness  of the  so-
+  13  [F(TF,JI;V2,A)  - Q].  lution.
3 The solution of the  system (5)-(10)  yields
the  off-farm  labor supply function,
Assuming  an  interior  solution,  (C, QJ,T,  7fTOF,
TL,  PI,  L2,  3) > 0,  the equilibrium is characterized  (11)  TF  =  TOF(X),
by the  following first-order  conditions:2 where X  - (w,o,PQ,Pc,T,
R'A'VIV2).
UC(C,TL;  V)  P  RAV




(6)  PQj  w  ~  T_ =  TF(Q) T(  P  )  In  the  ideal  situation,  data  on  time  allocated  to
off-farm activities  should be used to estimate equa-
aF(TF,f;V2 ,A)  tion (11). Because such data are not available in the
(7)  PQ  j.  (j  =>  j-  =  lj( Q,-lj)  Census  of Agriculture  data set used in this  study,
for V•/_  the number of farm operators reporting at least four
hours a day of off-farm work is used as a proxy for
(8)  TOF = TF(TF,TL),  "time constraint"  participation  in  the  off-farm  labor  market.  This
2The  vector  of  variables  (w,wj,PQ,Pc,V1,V 2,A,R,T)  taken  as  given  3 The  Arrow-Hurwicz-Uzawa  theorem  in  Takayama  (1985)  guaran-
have  been dropped for  notational convenience.  tees  the existence  and uniqueness  of the  solution.72  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
participation is considered to be a function of farm  Description  of  the 1992  Census Data Set
characteristics  (such  as farm  ownership  and orga-
nization  type),  operators'  personal  characteristics  Data
(such  as  age  and  gender),  and  general  economic
conditions  (such  as  developments  in  input-output  The data used  in this study  are  obtained  from the
markets).  Specifically,  the  dependent  variable,  1992  Census of Agriculture. The  sample includes
TOF,  is approximated  by  the  participation  rate  Rj  the  Northeast  states of Maine  (ME),  New  Hamp-
defined  as,  shire  (NH),  Vermont  (VT),  Massachusetts  (MA),
Rhode  Island  (RI),  Connecticut  (CT),  New  York
Njo  (NY),  New  Jersey  (NJ),  and  Pennsylvania  (PA).
R=  and Nj = Nj  + Nf  These  states have a total of 218  counties,  each  of
which is a unit of observation.  Table 3 defines  the
where Nj  and  Nf denote  the  number of farm  op-  variables, which are expressed as per farm figures.
erators reporting  any  off-farm  work days  and  op-  For example, per farm output in county j,  Q,  is the
erators reporting  no off-farm  work days in county  ratio of total farm output to the number of farms in
j,  respectively;  Nj is the  total number of operators  county j.
in  county j. The  relationship  between  county j's  The  data  contain  county-based  information  on
participation rate, Rj, and explanatory variables, Xj,  (1) personal characteristics,  such as average age of
is stated as,  an operator, number of male  and female operators,
number of black operators, and number of years an
1  operator has  spent  on the present farm;  (2) tenure
(12)  [1 + exp( - Po-Pl nx j,- )] of organization,  such  as number of operators  who
fully  or  partly  own  farms,  and  number  who  are
where  Ej  is  the  vector  of  random  disturbances.  tenants; (3) type of organization, such as number of
Equation  (12)  is  transformed  into  the  logit  func-  farms  operated  by  individuals/families,  partners,
tion,  and corporations;  (4) residence  of operators,  such
as number of operators  who live on  farm;  and (5)
/'(  . -R j \off-farm  employment information,  such as number
(13)  ln  1  R.  -[ln(Rj)  - ln(l  - R)]  of operators  working  off-farm  between  0  and  49
=  o +  llnXj + E,  days  a  year,  between  50  and  99 days  a year,  and
so on.
which  provided  the  best  goodness  of  fit  and  t-  Data used  in estimating  the production  function
ratios.4 The transformed  dependent  variable  now  are expressed in real terms. The real values for the
becomes  the  difference  between  the  natural  loga-  output and input variables  are obtained by dividing
rithm of off-farm  work participation and the natu-  monetary  variables  by  their respective  price  indi-
ral logarithm of on-farm  work participation  rates;  ces (with  1990-92  =  100).5 The price indices in-
that  is,  ln(Nl/Nf).  This  difference  reflects  the  clude production, feed, livestock and poultry, seed,
amount by which operators'  off-farm labor supply  fertilizer,  fuels,  supplies  and  repairs,  autos  and
is favored. Thus  equation  (13)  is estimated to  ap-  trucks,  farm machinery,  and building materials.
proximate  the  relationship  obtained  in  equation
(11).  Descriptive Statistics
The coefficient  31 =  aln(Rj/(l  - Rj))/alnXj  is
the percentage  change in ln(Nj/Nf)  corresponding  In  this section we briefly  discuss  some of the im-
to  one  percentage  change  in  Xj.  Disturbances  in  portant  features  of the  variables  used and  provide
equation  (13)  are  assumed  to  follow  an indepen-  an overall picture of the data  set using the means,
dent normal distribution  with zero mean and va-  correlation  coi-ef the standard deviations, and the correlation  coeffi- ance,  l/mRj(l1  - Rj),  where  mj is  the  number  of  cients
farms in countyj. The variance is a consequence of  The  participation rates in off-farm  work for the
a binomial  distribution underlying  R6 (Zellner and  Northeast  states  are as follows:  Connecticut,  0.55;
Lee  1965).  Maine,  0.58;  New  Hampshire,  0.59;  New  Jersey,
0.59; New York, 0.48;  Massachusetts, 0.54; Rhode
Island,  0.50;  Vermont,  0.49;  and  Pennsylvania,
4 Alternatives  include semi-log specification,  In(Nj°/A)  = 3 o+  PX j +
Ej . NJf  and Nf respectively  denote  the number  of operators  reporting  any
off-farm  work  days  and the  number  of  operators  reporting  no off-farm  The base year, (1990-92)  =  100, means that the average  of an  index
work days  in county j.  over  the time period  1990-92 is equal to  100.Tavernier, Temel, and Li  Farm Ownership and Off-Farm Work  73
Table 3.  Definition  of the Variables (1992  Census of Agriculture)
Variable
Names  Definitions
AGE  Operators'  average  age in  a county.
CAPITAL  Number of motor trucks,  wheel  tractors other than  garden tractors  and motor tillers,  grain and bean
combines,  mower conditioners,  and pickup  balers.
ENERGY  Real value of gasoline, other petroleum fuel,  and oil purchased for the farm business  (including
gasoline,  diesel fuel, natural  gas, LP gas, fuel oil, kerosene,  motor oil, and grease)  and electricity.
FAMILY  Farm  or business  organization  controlled  and operated  by  an individual/family,  including  family
operations  that are not incorporated  and not operated  under  a partnership  agreement.
FEED  Real  value of feed purchased for livestock  and poultry  (i.e., grain, hay,  silage, mixed feeds,
concentrates,  etc.).
FER-SEED  Sum of real values  of commercial  fertilizer purchased  (all forms, including rock phosphate and
gypsum) and real cost of seed for corn,  grains,  soybeans, tobacco,  cotton.
F-OWN  Number of full-owner operators.
GOV  Payments  received  for participating  in federal farm programs,  including  deficiency  and support price
payments,  disaster payments,  paid land  diversion, inventory  reduction  payments,  and payments
received for approved  soil and water water  conservation projects.
[(GOV)*  Interaction  term between government  payments  and part-ownership.
(P-OWN)]
LABOR  Number of farm  workers.
LAND  Acres  of total land  used in farming.
LST  Real value of livestock  and poultry purchased  (cattle, calves,  hogs, pigs, sheep,  lambs,  goats, horses,
chicks,  poults, started  pullets).
p  Share  of livestock  and poultry sold in total farm output.
MALE  Number of male operators.
OFI  Other  farm income, including  custom  work (includes  income earned  when the farm operator provides
labor and these operations  are conducted  in conjunction with other agricultural  operations), rental
income (associated  with renting out land or  crop allotments),  forest  products  (income from  only
forest products  or Christmas  trees), and  other farm-related  income (includes  income from hunting
leases,  fishing fees,  and other recreational  services,  sales of farm by-products, and  other businesses
or income closely  related  to the agricultural  operation).
OI  (GOV + OFI).
[(OI)*  Interaction  term between  other income and part-ownership.
(P-OWN)]
Q  Real value of total farm output.
Q  Fitted value of Q from the production function.
PARTNER  Number of farms  operated  by two or more persons  in partnership.  Partnership operation  is defined  as
two  or more persons  who have  agreed  on the  amount of their contribution  (capital and labor) and
distribution of profits. Coownership  of land  by husband  and wife  or joint filling  of income tax
forms by  husband and wife  does not constitute  a partnership unless  a specific  agreement to  share
contributions,  decision making, profits,  and liabilities exists.  Production  under contract or under a
share  rental agreement  does not constitute  a partnership.
P-OWN  Number  of part-owner  operators.
TENANT  Number  of tenant operators.
Ri =  Ni/N,  County  i's participation  rate. N° and Ni respectively denote  the number  of operators  reporting any
off-farm  work days and the total number of operators  in county i. The Census  of Agriculture
classifies  an operator  as one participating  in off-farm work if he/she spends at  least four hours a
day on off-farm  work.
SPECU  Speculative  pressure, defined  as the ratio  of county  i's estimated  market  value  ($) per  acre of land
and buildings  to that of the  United States.  The operator's  estimated  market value obtained  from the
1992  Census of Agriculture  includes  market  value of the  operator's  dwelling,  value of farm
buildings,  dwellings used by  laborers,  fruit  packing  sheds,  vegetable  sheds, etc.,  that  are used to
prepare  farm products for marketing. The variable  SPECU does  not include  (1) value of major
agricultural  manufacturing  or processing  plants,  such as cotton  gins  or sugar mills, and  (2) value of
institutional  or other buildings  used for nonagricultural purposes,  such  as hospitals, dormitories,
stores, filling stations,  factories,  etc.  In the case  of an operator renting  land from others,  the  market
value of the land  and buildings  is that operator's estimated value.
URBAN  Population  per square  mile as a proxy  for urbanization.
WAGE  Ratio  of county's  total payroll  to the number of farm  workers.
YEARS  Average number of years  spent  on the present  farm.74  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table  4.  Descriptive  Statistics of Farm Tenure Variables  (Averages)
North-
CT  ME  NH  NJ  NY  MA  RI  VT  PA  east
F-OWN  0.64  0.67  0.68  0.74  0.62  0.67  0.59  0.54  0.59  0.63
P-OWN  0.28  0.29  0.27  0.17  0.31  0.23  0.29  0.38  0.32  0.29
TENANT  0.08  0.04  0.06  0.09  0.07  0.10  0.12  0.07  0.09  0.08
FAMILY  0.81  0.89  0.88  0.78  0.80  0.78  0.80  0.86  0.88  0.84
PARTNER  0.09  0.05  0.06  0.08  0.10  0.06  0.07  0.08  0.09  0.08
OTHERS  0.10  0.06  0.06  0.14  0.10  0.16  0.13  0.06  0.03  0.08
(F-OWN + P-OWN + TENANT)  =  1 and (FAMILY  + PARTNER + OTHERS)  =  1.
0.53.  The highest  participation  rates  are  found  in  The mean  values  of the ownership  categories-
Maine,  New  Hampshire,  and  New  Jersey,  where  full-owners  (F-OWN), part-owners  (P-OWN),  and
most farms are controlled  by full-owner operators.  others-are  given  in table  4.  As  the  table  shows,
Furthermore,  most  part-owner  operators  are  in  63%  of operators  in the Northeast  are  full-owner
New York (0.31), Vermont (0.38),  and Pennsylva-  operators,  29%  are  part-owner  operators,  and  8%
nia  (0.32)  (table  4).  Regarding  the  organization
type,  we observe  that family/individual  farm orga-
nizations  are strongly  dominant in all of the states.  200  i9
The average percentage of family/individual  farms
in the Northeast  is approximately  0.84, which  im- 
plies  that  most  full-owner  and part-owner  opera-  160
tors run family/individual  farm organizations. Part-
nership  farms,  which  are  not  dominant  in  any
states, are negatively correlated (-0.70) to off-farm  120
participation  (table  1).  However,  in  states  where
partnership  farms  are  important,  per  farm  live-  1 l
stock/poultry  and  nursery/greenhouse  sales  are  80
high. Also,  the number  of  years  an  operator  has  60
spent  on the present  farm  is positively  correlated
with partnership farms (0.63 in table  1). This result 
supports  the  case  that  operators  of  partnership  20
farms stay in farming  relatively longer than do op-
erators of family farms.  0  C  ME  MA  N  NY  PA  RI 
A historical  overview  of the  data shows  a sig-  '
nificant change in the number of farms engaging in
dairy  and nursery  products.  The first change took 
place  in  the dairy  sector during  the period  1987- 
92. Because of the  1985 buyout program, the num- 
ber of farms in the dairy sector decreased, although
total sales increased. As a result, the dairy sector in 
the  Northeast  region experienced  a noticeable  in-  S  S 
crease  in per farm  dairy  sales  (figures  la,  lb, 2a, 
2b,  and  2c).  The  second  change  occurred  in  the 
nursery/greenhouse  sector during the same period,  -15  ' 
which  is  consistent  with expectations  that the in- 
creasing  value  of  land  in  the  Northeast  directed 
farmers to high-return agricultural products such as 
nursery/greenhouse  crops  and  away  from  grain. 
Thus, the number of farmers producing high-return  25
products  increased  in  the  region  (Figures  3a,  3b,
and 3c).  Overall,  both  the  shrinking  in the  labor-
intensive  dairy sector  and the  moderate growth  in  -
the  nursery  sector  are  expected  to  contribute  to  Figure 1.  a. Per Farm Dairy Sales. b. Number of
off-farm  work participation.  Farms.Tavernier, Temel, and Li  Farm Ownership and Off-Farm Work  75
~30  (FAMILY)  or  by  a  partnership  (PARTNER).
These  variables  are  constructed  such  that  (FAM-
25  ILY + PARTNER + OTHERS)  - 1. Therefore only
the  FAMILY  and  PARTNER  categories  are  in-
20§  i  cluded  in the  estimations.  Their estimated  coeffi-
cients  are interpreted as the difference  from OTH-
115^ -- ^  ~ERS.  The data indicate that 84% of the farms in the
''5r15~  fg  ^|  *~  ^Northeast  region  are  operated  by  families/
individuals. The highest percentage (89%) of farms
'°  B  51  *~  B  B  JI~  H~  categorized  as FAMILY  is found in Maine.
The  correlation  coefficient  (0.70)  between  the
5  1  1-  number of family farms and off-farm participation
suggests that these farms are more likely to supply
B~0 *  *  *  B  B  IS  I  II  labor  off  the  farm.  According  to  the  correlation
CT  ME  MA  NH  NJ  NY  PA  sVT  coefficients, these farms  are  also less likely to en-
gage in  livestock  production  (-0.48)  and  nursery
farming (-0.48) and to invest time in their present
1220  farming  activity  (-0.63).  Hence, the  data suggest
that per farm total sales  are generally low in states
1"'0  Iwith  a high  percentage  of family-operated  farms
s8o  (correlation  coefficient of -0.73)  (table  1).
Ia,51  l~~Its'l~  ~Table  5 presents  average values of the variables
,I«  across individual states and the Northeast region. It
is observed  that the participation  rates (denoted by
40  I'5d  I~l_ „  1~  1  8  R) for Maine  (0.58),  New  Hampshire  (0.59),  and
2  i0  New Jersey (0.59) are above the mean participation
rate  for the entire region (0.52).  This observation,
. M_...iE  0..0  N  s,  a-—•  —Si—i.  04  ;  together with the  evidence that  Connecticut,  New
cr  ME  MA  NH  NJ  NY  PA  RI  VT
Mstat  MJersey,  and Rhode Island have the highest per acre
80  - estimated  market  values  of  land  at  $74,162,
,0  $123,656,  and $76,082, respectively (1992 Census
of Agriculture),  argues  that there is  a strong moti-
1860  vation for farmers to hold land for speculative pur-




The system of equations  (5)-(10) is solved simul-
1°  RI  'n  [I  '  '  I  —^  —:  taneously  for the  endogenous  variables  including
-10i»-  '  klj  j  lp  i  Ig  {lfarm  output, consumption,  production  inputs,  and
...- 20-  I'  II  off-farm  labor supply. However, simultaneity  bias
0S r"«'5  "  a  presents  a problem in estimating equation  (13)  be-
cause  of the simultaneous  determination  of TF in
Figure 2.  a. Per Farm Grain Sale.  b. Per Farm  equation  (6),  Q in  equation  (9),  and  TOF in equa-
Grain Sales.  c.  Number of Farms.  tion (8). To address this problem, farm output from
the estimated production function is assumed to be
are tenants (sum  to one). New Jersey has the high-  the expected  profit maximizing  output and is used
est percentage of full-owner operators (74%), Ver-  as an instrumental  variable in the estimation  of the
mont has the highest percentage of part-owner  op-
erators  (38%),  and  Rhode  Island  has  the  highest
percentage  of tenants  (12%).  6 The variable  SPECU does not exactly reflect the estimated farm-use
A  similar  classification  involves  the  variables  value of land, since in its calculation  the general price  levels, rather than
related  to the  type  of  organiza  ,  sh  as  e  agricultural  input-output prices.  are used. Net cash rent, defined  as cash
related  to  the  type  of  organization,  such  as  the  rent minus  property tax,  is  one of the proxies for the farm-use  value  of
number  of farms  operated  by  a family/individual  land. This measure was suggested in a conversation with G. Wunderlich.76  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table  5.  Descriptive  Statistics of the Variables  in Logarithm (Averages)
North-
CT  ME  NH  NJ  NY  MA  RI  VT  PA  east
In(Q)  -2.39  -2.91  -2.92  -2.93  -2.58  -2.93  -2.73  -2.77  -2.85  -2.76
In(CAPITAL)  2.07  2.02  1.89  2.09  2.16  2.14  2.11  2.10  2.09  2.10
In(LABOR)  2.18  1.83  1.47  2.01  1.52  1.85  1.67  1.27  1.33  1.54
In(LAND)  4.63  5.36  5.14  4.48  5.44  4.63  4.33  5.39  5.09  5.13
In(ENERGY)  -4.27  -4.61  -4.61  -4.09  -4.10  -4.03  -4.50  -4.50  -4.37  -4.29
ln(LST)  -4.94  -5.25  -5.61  -5.76  -4.81  -5.54  -5.07  -5.04  -4.91  -5.04
In(FER-SEED)  -4.01  -4.54  -4.46  -4.17  -4.29  -4.38  -4.34  -4.62  -4.57  -4.42
ln(p*LST)  -313  -416  -317  -310  -431  -333  -484  -415  -517  -436
R  0.55  0.58  0.59  0.59  0.48  0.54  0.50  0.49  0.53  0.52
ln(R/1  - R)  0.19  0.33  0.37  0.36  -0.07  0.14  0.01  -0.06  0.10  0.09
ln(WAGE)  -5.11  -6.32  -5.30  -5.70  -6.21  -5.83  -4.63  -5.91  -6.37  -6.08
ln(AGE)  6.31  6.27  6.27  6.29  6.26  6.28  6.29  6.25  6.27  6.27
ln(MALE)  8.22  8.10  7.67  8.40  8.59  8.21  7.33  8.06  8.66  8.44
In(FEMALE)  6.45  6.02  6.07  6.56  6.24  6.46  5.26  6.10  5.95  6.14
In(F-OWN)  7.91  7.79  7.43  8.22  8.14  7.89  6.98  7.58  8.20  8.03
In(P-OWN)  7.16  7.00  6.61  6.81  7.65  7.13  6.06  7.24  7.58  7.37
In(TENANT)  5.73  5.02  4.96  6.13  5.82  5.93  5.19  5.59  6.20  5.87
In(FAMILY)  8.17  8.11  7.73  8.37  8.52  8.18  7.27  8.04  8.61  8.39
In(PARTNER)  6.00  5.26  5.11  5.90  6.39  5.88  4.31  5.74  6.28  6.07
In(GOV)  -6.03  -5.87  -6.20  -5.72  -5.81  -5.96  -6.18  -6.20  -5.94  -5.92
In(OFI)  -5.62  -6.27  -7.45  -6.20  -6.52  -6.27  -5.46  -6.21  -7.11  -5.41
ln(OI)  -5.08  -5.31  -5.71  -5.12  -5.38  -5.25  -4.87  -5.47  -5.59  -5.42
ln(AVGYRS)  5.36  5.29  5.25  5.25  5.34  5.31  5.25  5.26  5.36  5.32
In(BLACK)  1.61  1.61  1.61  2.78  1.74  1.98  1.61  1.61  1.86  1.85
ln(SPECU)  4.36  2.70  3.26  4.50  2.79  4.13  4.46  2.99  3.18  3.26
participation model.7 This approach also allows us
to capture the effect of inefficient input-output  de-  Q =  + Q=  AIX  ''P .
cisions  on  off-farm  work participation.  A statisti-  i=1
cally  significant  and  negative  coefficient  of  the
variable lfiQ in the  participation model would im-  Ql and  Qc are respectively  the values  of final live-
ply  that  inefficiency  in  the  input-output  choices  stock output and final crop  output. p is the share  of
partly  directs  operators  toward  off-farm  employ-  final livestock products in total final output. A,  cti,
ment.  and  Pi are  unknown parameters.  Separate  produc-
tion  functions  for  the  two  final  products  are  not
Production Function  implied and production is joint. Furthermore, it is a
useful  simplifying assumption  that the true coeffi-
Most  firms  in  agriculture  are  multiproduct  firms  cients  in  the  production  function  depend  on  the
that  produce  at  least  two  broad  classes  of  final  share  of livestock products  in the total output,  p.
products-crop  products  and  livestock  products.  The production function estimated is then  speci-
The  production  of  these  final  products  requires  fied as
many  of the  same  inputs,  but  the  technical  rela-
tionship between  inputs  and outputs  seems  likely 
to  differ.  For  example,  when  livestock  products  (14)  lnQ = ln(A)+  (oti+ pi)lnXi+  .
dominate output, the livestock input-to-output ratio  i
is likely to be higher than that when crop products  The dependent variable for the production function
dominate output. In order to capture differences of
in  put  parameters  due to product mix differences  is county  's real  farm  output,  Qj  defined  as  the input  parameters  due  to  product  mix  differences,  ratio of the total sales deflated by the price index of
we formulate agriculture  as  a multiproduct indus-  all  farm products. To permit the  input-output rela-
try (Huffman  1976) and specify  the technical rela-  farm  product  mix  a  thereby tionship to vary by farm product mix  and thereby tionship between  outputs and  inputs  as  g  y in mix of to better fit observations differing widely in mix of
crop and livestock output, the measure for the mix
7  Huffman (1980) adopts the same approach  to avoid the simultaneous  of output (the livestock  output share  of total farm
equation bias.  output,  p)  is  included  as  a separate  input into theTavernier, Temel, and Li  Farm Ownership and Off-Farm Work  77
production  function.  The  coefficients  of the  esti-  comes  scarcer  and  values  increase,  operators
mated production  function,  switch  from  land-intensive  farming  to  higher-
valued dairy,  nursery, and greenhouse enterprises.
ln  (a  + pA3)  This result  is  in  fact  supported by  the correlation
alnXi  coefficients  between  per farm  land value and  per
farm dairy  sales  (0.48)  and per farm  nursery  and are  the  elasticity  of  the  independent  variable  X  farm dairy  sales  (0.48)  and  per farm  nursery  and
greenhouse  sales  (0.39).  Another  explanation for with respect to farm output  Q.  Notice that  the pa-  greenhouse  sales  (0.39).  Another  explanation  for
rameter  p is also  another variable. The coefficient  this negative relationship between LAND  and farm
Pi measures the  influence of p  on  output  is that  the  increasing  value of land due  to
urbanization  leads  to  land  speculation,  which  re-
/ alnQ  suits  in  decreasing  investment  in maintaining  the
alnQ  \a(lnaX,)  quality of farmland.  To  this end, we  observe that
n  that is  -=  ,.  holding  land for  speculative  purposes reduces  per
alnXi,  ap  acre  farm  output.  One  of the  implications  of the
A positive  3Pi  represents  an increase  in the  output  negative relation of land with agricultural  produc-
elasticity  due  to  marginal  increase  in  the  output  tion is that farmland preservation policies in effect
share of, for example,  livestock products.  have a limited  capacity to offset the conversion  of
The farm production  function (equation  [14])  is  land  to nonfarm uses,  a finding  supported by  Lo-
estimated by ordinary least squares technique. The  pez,  Adelaja,  and Andrews  (1988).
estimation  of  log-log  production  function  shows
that  72%  of  the  variation  in  farm  output  is  ex-  Off-Farm Work Participation  Model
plained  by the  conventional  input variables  (table
6).  All  of the  inputs  (except  LAND)  are  statisti-  The dependent  variable for the participation model
cally  significant  at  the  0.05  level  or better.  Not  is the natural logarithm of the odds of participating
surprisingly, the estimated coefficient  of LAND  is  in  the  off-farm  labor  market,  ln(Rj/(l  - Ri))  or
negative, implying that farm output is low in coun-  ln(NjA/Nl).  The  independent  variables  related  to
ties where farm land is abundant. This finding vali-  farm ownership  categories  include  full-owner  op-
dates the argument  that as land for agriculture  be-  erators (F-OWN),  part-owner operators (P-OWN),
Table  6.  Production Function and Off-Farm  Work Participation Model
Production Function  Participation  Model
Dependent  Variable:  InQ  Dependent  Variable:  ln(R/(l  - R))
Independent  Variables  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.
CONSTANT  -0.31  (-0.49)
In(CAPITAL)  0.41  (2.10)**
In(LABOR)  0.09  (2.30)**
ln(LAND)  -0.04  (-0.66)
In(LST)  0.00  (3.11)**
p*ln(LST)  0.00  (2.36)**
In(ENERGY)  0.10  (1.64)*
In(FEED)  0.33  (9.88)**
ln(FER-SEED)  0.35  (5.34)**
CONSTANT  -29.95  (-6.52)**
liQ  -0.22  (-4.02)**
In(WAGE)  -0.02  (-1.06)
In(P-OWN)  1.32  (3.72)**
In(TENANT)  -0.01  (-0.23)
In(PARTNER)  -0.15  (-2.23)**
In(AGE)  4.00  (5.61)**
In(YEARS)  -1.11  (-3.77)**
ln(FEMALE/MALE)  0.22  (1.82)*
ln(OI)  -1.83  (-3.98)**
In(OI*(P-OWN))  0.26  (4.02)**
R
2 0.72  0.51
n  158  158
**  and *,  respectively, show the variables  significant  at the 0.05 and 0.1 levels. The variable  fiQ is the fitted value of farm output
lnQ from the estimation of the  production function in the first column  of table 6.78  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
and tenants  (TENANT).  A full-owner  operator  is  operated by others.  Furthermore, a tenant does not
one who  owns the land he/she operates.  This defi-  exclude the case where  he/she might own a parcel
nition  does  not exclude  the  case  where  he/she  of  land  operated  by  others.  These  variables  are
might have a parcel of land rented out. Similarly, a  expressed  as proportions. For example, F-OWN  is
part-owner  operator is one who  partially owns the  defined  as  the ratio  of the  number  of full-owner
land  he/she  operates.  This  also  does  not exclude  operators  to the  total  number of operators,  which
the case  where he/she might  own a parcel of land  implies  (F-OWN  + P-OWN  + TENANT)  _  1.
Therefore,  one  of  the  ownership  categories  is
250  dropped  from  the  estimations  to  avoid  multicol-
i  r2[1  l  linearity.  The estimated coefficient  of the relevant
ownership  variable  is  then  interpreted  as  the  dif-
200  ference  from  the  coefficient  of the  dropped  vari-
able.
The  parameter  estimates  of  the  participation
15so0  model are reported in table  6. The parameters  have
the expected signs.  All of the variables  are in natu-
§8.  I|  f  ral logarithms; therefore, the estimated coefficients
"ion.~  *  5003  11  represent  elasticities  with respect to off-farm work
participation.  The  model  explains  51%  of  the
variation  in  off-farm  work  participation  in  the
50  Northeast.
The participation  model includes  the  fitted val-
ues  of farm output  (lfiQ)  as  an independent  vari-
0  able to account for the extent to which input-output
CT  ME  MA  NH  NO  NY  PA  o  VT  decisions  affect  off-farm  employment.  Because
00  off-farm  employment  is  most  prevalent  among
small farms, it is not surprising to find that partici-
20  II  "5  pation  is  inversely  related  to  farm  output.8 The
coefficient  of  lfiQ  is,  as  expected,  negative  and
0  statistically significant,  and it suggests that  a  10%
If  jl  5  ,  g  Iill  ,5x.'.^,<increase  in farm  output decreases  off-farm  partici-
o1°  _  o.  t  ,  &3 ,k ,t  A  t  i  SN  P  pation  by  2.2%.  Hence,  agricultural  and  public
I  ''f-  M  1*'  -l  NY  PA  VT g.  l  i112  policies  that  increase  farm  income  decrease  the
*-ie  1o~.  IIgl  :  ''  5likelihood  that  farm  operators  will  participate  in
Is.< < s e e~  ~  the off-farm labor market. The negative  coefficient
.-.  I5  of wages for hired labor suggests that participation
is low in counties  where wages are high. However,
-30  this relationship is not statistically  significant.
60  The ownership participation  elasticities  indicate
that farm ownership  affects the decision to partici-
50  I  pate  in  off-farm  work.  Specifically  the  findings
suggest that  a  10%  increase  in farms  operated  by
I  40  g.  l  5  -part-owner  operators increases participation in off-
1  S  §  II0  ~  lI~  '5  65  farm  work  by  13.2%.  This  finding  supports  our
33I  3,I~  52§  I  earlier  argument  that  part-owners  are  mostly  en-
w  3a0  1  S  B  F311  gaged  in seasonal crop farming. Moreover,  the re-
i  l  31F  it  S  g  a  m  g  1i'~  ~suits  show  a  decreased  tendency  on  the  part  of
20  Il  lI  tenants to participate  in off-farm  employment  pri-
marily because they have already committed them-
io BOf  |5F03  SI3~  IFai  1S  1  I1,3,3 selves  to farming  by  renting  farmland.  More  spe-
cifically,  a  10%  increase  in farms  operated by ten-
CT  ME  MA  NH  NJ  NY  PA  RI  nV
States
3Filir  1  a  Per Farm  Nursr  Snes  Pr  8 See table  1.2 in Aheam  and Lee  (1991) for the  negative relationship
Figure  3.  a.  Per Farm Nursery  Sales.  b.  Per  between  farm  size (in sales) and  off-farm  income  in the United  States,
Farm Nursery Sales.  c.  Number of Farms.  1986.Tavernier, Temel,  and Li  Farm Ownership and Off-Farm Work  79
ants  lowers  the  participation  by  0.1%.  This  and  surprisingly  participate  in  off-farm  work  as
negative  relationship is also supported by the esti-  well  (correlation  0.59).  This finding  is  surprising
mation result in table 2, which suggests that tenants  because,  although  dairy  farming  is  highly  labor
positively contribute to farm output and hence tend  intensive,  female operators  are able  to invest time
to concentrate  on  farm activities.  in  off-farm  activities.
It bears noting that the type of farm organization  Farming  experience  is proxied  by  the  variable
is  also  significant  in  explaining  the  variation  in  YEARS,  defined  as  the  average  number  of years
off-farm  work participation.  In particular,  the sign  that  an  operator  has  been  operating  the  present
of  the  partnership  variable,  PARTNER,  is  nega-  farm.  The  coefficient  of YEARS,  -1.11,  implies
tive,  which  indicates  that  farm  operators  of farm  that  a  10%  increase in the number of years of on-
enterprises organized  as partnerships are less likely  farm experience  reduces the likelihood of off-farm
to  participate  in  the  off-farm  labor  market.  This  participation  by  11.1%.  Thus,  as  farming  experi-
finding may be due in part to the large capital and  ence increases,  the likelihood  that a farm operator
human resource  investments  necessary  to operate  will participate  in off-farm work decreases.  How-
commercial  farm businesses. The results thus sug-  ever, the estimated  coefficient  of AGE of  an  op-
gest  that  the commercialization  of agriculture  de-  erator  suggests  the  opposite  effect.  This  result is
creases competition between farm and nonfarm la-  puzzling  and perhaps  suggests  that farm operators
bor.  are entering farming at older ages. This assumption
The personal  characteristics  of farm  operators,  is supported to some extent by  the lack of signifi-
such as age  and gender,  significantly  contribute to  cance  between AGE and YEARS.
off-farm  employment.  The results show  that farm  The estimated  coefficient  for  other income,  OI
operators  increasingly  allocate  labor  to  off-farm  (payments  received  for  participation  in  federal
work  as  they  grow  older.  This result is  also  sup-  farm programs  denoted by  GOV and income  from
ported  by  the  correlation  coefficient  of  0.59  be-  other farm activities denoted by OFI), is significant
tween  age and off-farm  participation.  The finding  and  positive.  The  results  indicate  that  a  10%  in-
seems  to  contradict  the  life-cycle  hypothesis,  crease  in  supplementary  income  reduces  off-farm
which  suggests that elderly  operators  tend to con-  work  participation  by  approximately  2%.  This
sume what they earned  when young.  The hypoth-  finding  suggests,  in  part,  that  government  farm-
esis  projects  a  low  off-farm  participation  at  later  income policy  subsidizes  off-farm  work.
stages in life.9 A possible reason for this finding is  The effects of other income on participation can
that  older farm  operators  may have  shorter  plan-  be further evaluated with reference to the estimated
ning  horizons and are thus reluctant  to make  sub-  coefficient  for the  interaction  (OI*P-OWN)  term.
stantial  investments  in new technology.  The posi-  This coefficient  is  significant  and  positive. Thus,
tive  correlation  coefficient  of 0.42 between  AGE  as the supplementary  income of part-owner  opera-
and per  farm  grain  sales  suggests  that  older farm  tors increases,  so does  the tendency  to participate
operators may  switch from  the more labor inten-  in  off-farm  activities. ° In  other  words,  part-
sive  enterprises  such  as  dairy  and  vegetables  to  operators  are  more  responsive  to  off-farm  work
grain production.  opportunities  as  their  supplementary  income  in-
The  results  also  suggest  that  gender  plays  an  creases.
important role in off-farm participation. The analy-
sis  shows  that the  coefficient  of the  variable  FE-
MALE/MALE  is positive and significant and indi-  Conclusion
cates female  operators  are  more  likely to  partici-
pate in off-farm  activities  than are male operators.  n  ff-f  ii  f ^~..  ,~.  *c  . T^ATT-;An  off-farm  work  participation  model  for  the
A positive correlation of 0.49 between FEMALE/ A positive  correlation  of 0.49  between FEMALE/  Northeast region  is  estimated  to  capture  the  rela-
MALE  and per farm dairy  sales illustrates  that fe-  tionship  between  farm  ownership  and  operators'
male  operators  engage  in  labor-intensive  farming  off-farm  work  decisions.  A  novel  feature  of  this
study is the conceptualization  of the importance  of
farm ownership in off-farm employment  decisions.
9  When the  variables AGE  and (AGE)
2 are simultaneously  included in  Th  empirical  framework  involves  the  estimation
the participation  model,  it is found that AGE is convex  with respect to
ln(Nj°Al). In particular,  we find  aln(Nj/Nj)/aln(AGE)  < 0 and a
2in(Nj/  of a farm  production function  and  a participation
NJ)/1ln(AGE)
2 > 0, which imply that up to a certain age, off-farm  work
is not desirable,  but  after the  critical  age,  off-farm  work  participation
gains  momentum.  Among  the factors  behind  this  convex labor  supply
decision are farmers'  risk-averse  attitudes toward likely health problems  '  The  interactions  between  the  payments  and  full-owners  and  be-
at later  ages. (These estimation  results can be obtained from the authors  tween the  payments  and  tenants  are  also  estimated but are  found  to be
upon request.)  insignificant.80  April 1997  Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
rate  model.  The estimations  are performed  by  the  holding among Farm Families, ed.  M.C.  Hallberg,  J.L.
heteroscedasticity-consistent  ordinary  least square  Findeis,  and  D.A.  Lass.  Ames:  Iowa  State  University
technique  using per  farm  averages  for the  North-  Press.
east region.  Barlett, P.  1991.  "Motivations for Part-time Farmers."  In Mul-
In  summary,  the  empirical  evidence  suggests  tiple Job-holding among Farm Families, ed.  M.C.  Hall- In  summary,  the  empirical  evidence  suggests berg, J.L. Findeis, and D.A. Lass. Ames: Iowa  State Uni-
that  (1)  ownership plays  a significant  role in farm  versity Press.
operators'  off-farm  work  participation  decisions,  Barnum, N.H.,  and L.  Squire.  1979.  "An  Econometric  Appli-
and in particular, part-owner operators increasingly  cation of the  Theory of the Farm-household."  Journal of
allocate  labor  from  self-employed  farm  work  to  Development Economics 6:79-102.
off-farm activities; (2) specialization in farming re-  Berry,  D.  1978.  "Effects  of Urbanization  on  Agricultural Ac-
duces the likelihood that an operator will seek off-  tivities."  Growth and Change 9:2-8.
farm work;  and (3)  other incomes  operate as  sub-  Carriker,  L.G.,  R.M.  Langemeier,  T.C.  Schroeder,  and  M.A.
sidies and reduce the likelihood that farm operators  Featherstone.  1993.  "Propensity to Consume Farm Family
will participate in off-farm work. It is important to  Disposable  Income  from  Separate  Sources."  American
reemphasize that ownership variables  interact with  Joural  of Agricultural  Economics 75:73944.
supplementary  income  from other farm-related ac-  Fuller, A.  1991.  "Multiple  Job-holding  among Farm  Families
tivities and payments  from federal farm programs.  in Canada."  In Multiple Job-holding among Farm Fami-
In particular, part-owner  operators are very respon-  lies, ed. M.C.  Hallberg, J.L. Findeis, and D.A. Lass. Ames:
Iowa  State University  Press.
sive to participating in the off-farm labor market as 
opportunities  for supplementary  income  arise.  Gebremehdin,  T.G. 1991. "Off-farm  Employment Participation
Theoretic  ,an  interesting  question  to  be  in-  . . in Louisiana:  An Analysis of Survey Results."  In Multiple
Theoretically,  an mteresting  question  to  be i-  Job-holding among Farm Families, ed.  M.C.  Hallberg,
vestigated is the relationship between the farm as a  J.L.  Findeis, and D.A. Lass. Ames: Iowa  State University
multiproduct  or single-product  firm and  off-farm  Press.
work participation.  However,  operators'  risk atti-  Gladwin, H.C.  1991.  "Multiple Job-holding  among Farm Fami-
tudes  and  farm product  characteristics  need  to be  lies  and  the Increase  in Women's  Farming."  In Multiple
analyzed together to provide  a complete picture of  Job-holding among Farm Families, ed.  M.C.  Hallberg,
the developments  in agricultural  labor markets.  J.L. Findeis,  and D.A. Lass.  Ames:  Iowa State  University
A  significant  contribution  of this  study  is that  Press.
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